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NeuroEthics: NeuroLaw 
Stephen J. Morse 
Oxford Handbook Online (Philosophy) 
Abstract 
 
This entry discusses whether the findings of the new neuroscience based 
largely on functional brain imaging raise new normative questions and entail 
normative conclusions for ethical and legal theory and practice.  After 
reviewing the source of optimism about neuroscientific contributions and the 
current scientific status of neuroscience, it addresses a radical challenge 
neuroscience allegedly presents: whether neuroscience proves persons do 
not have agency.  It then considers a series of discrete topics in neuroethics 
and neurolaw, including the “problem” of responsibility, enhancement of 
normal functioning, threats to civil liberty, competence, informed consent, 
end of life issues, and the ethics of caution.  It suggests that the ethical and 
legal resources to respond to the findings of neuroscience already exist and 
will do so for the foreseeable future. 
 
Keywords 
 
neuroscience, neuroethics, neurolaw, agency, responsibility, enhancement, 
civil liberty, competence, informed consent 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Neuroethics and neurolaw, which have become subjects of intense 
attention in the recent past (e.g., Chatterjee and Farah, 2013; Farah, 2010; 
Garland, 2004; Glannon, 2007, 2013; Goodenough & Tucker, 2010; Hoffman, 
2014; Illes, 2005; Illes and Sahakian, 2011; Jones, Schall & Shen, 2014; Jones 
& Ginther, 2015; Levy, 2007; Morse, 2004; Morse & Roskies, 2013; Pardo 
and Patterson, 2013; Roskies, 2004, 2016; Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013; Vincent, 
2013) address two distinct sets of questions.  The first are largely empirical, 
asking about the neural correlates and sometimes neural causes of ethical and 
legal judgment and decision making.  The second set of questions addresses 
how the findings of neuroscience should influence ethical and legal theory 
and practice. Some doubt the independent existence of neuroethics and 
neurolaw.  Such critics believe either that these alleged fields are simply 
questions within pure neuroscience or bioethics or that the field should be 
expanded to include contributions from the allied disciplines of cognitive 
science and psychology.  There is merit to both types of critique, but this entry 
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will proceed on the assumptions that neuroethics and neurolaw are sufficiently 
independent areas of inquiry to justify independent treatment and that allied 
sciences are part of the field because cognitive, affective and social 
neuroscience, the branches of neuroscience most relevant to ethics and law, 
are necessarily tied to allied disciplines such as cognitive science and 
psychology. This entry will return to why the allied sciences should be 
included below in Part III. 
The findings of the first set of neuroethical studies seldom have 
normative consequences for ethical or legal theory or practice.  Let us call this 
branch of these disciplines, empirical neuroethics and neurolaw.  For example, 
a recent, sophisticated neuroscience paper used a technique that permitted 
inferences about the causal role that certain brain regions may have played in 
mental events (Buckholtz et al., 2015).  It found, inter alia, that dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activity is associated with changes in decisions 
about punishment but not about blameworthiness.  Finding a selective causal 
role for DLPFC in norm enforcement is fascinating, but the paper recognized 
that it was normatively inert.  In a related recent study that employed a very 
creative methodology, Ginther et al (2016) were able to dissociate the brain 
regions associated with harm, mental state and integrative harm/mental state 
evaluations in making third party punishment decisions.  Once again, this is 
fascinating research, but it does not entail any particular view of what 
punishments should be assigned to the offender in the experimental scenarios. 
No inference about the propriety of particular blameworthiness or punishment 
norms is possible from a finding about which brain region of interest (ROI) 
seems implicated.  Nor is it surprising that different psychological processes 
should be associated with different brain activity.  For a final example, the 
noted neurophilosopher Patricia Churchland’s recent book, Braintrust: What 
Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality (2012), provided a neuroscientific 
account of how morality is biologically undergirded, but it does not purport 
to claim based on neuroscience what the principles and rules should be.    
No single empirical finding is likely to have normative implications, 
but even when various findings converge on a particular result, it is still often 
unclear what follows for guiding ethics or law.  Perhaps the best example is 
the question of adolescent criminal responsibility and how adolescent 
offenders (and perhaps young adults) should be treated by the criminal and 
juvenile justice systems.  Widely-accepted and often replicated consistent 
findings in cognitive science, developmental psychology and neuroscience 
have found that adolescent rational capacities and brain maturation differ 
significantly on average from those of adults and that there are differences 
within the adolescent years (e.g., Scott et al, 2016).  There is no more powerful 
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example of how various findings with genuine moral and legal relevance have 
converged.  Nonetheless, it is not clear whether and in what way adolescent 
offenders should be treated differently from adults.  If one has a moral and 
legal theory that suggests an outcome based on the facts, then it is the moral 
or legal theory that is playing an essential role in deciding what to do.  Unless 
that theory is uncontroversial and the conclusion about the implications of the 
facts for that theory are equally uncontroversial, however, it is still not clear 
what follows from those facts (see Berker, 2009 and Kamm, 2009, for 
particularly trenchant, scientifically-informed analyses of the normative 
significance of neuroscientific findings).  
It is of course no surprise that all human behavior should have in part a 
neuroscientific foundation.  After all, without the types of brains we have, 
morality would be a pure abstraction in the mind of no one and guiding no 
behavior.  If neuroscience (or any other science) is able to discover 
incontrovertible truths about the essence of human nature or the limits of our 
capacities, such information will certainly be relevant to normative analysis, 
but such truths are unlikely to per se entail normative conclusions about how 
we should live together. 
The second set of questions is explicitly normative.  Let us call this 
branch normative neuroethics and normative neurolaw.  For example, in a 
widely-noticed chapter, neuroscientists Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen 
argued that the increasingly mechanistic understanding of the brain/mind that 
neuroscience is producing will convince us that we are all simply victims of 
neuronal circumstances, that no one is genuinely responsible, and that 
retributive justice should be abandoned in favor of a purely consequential 
prediction/prevention scheme for the social control of dangerous behavior 
(Greene & Cohen, 2006). Such work is almost entirely normative and shall be 
the focus of this on-line entry.  Normative neuroethics/neurolaw may be said 
to have two distinct but sometimes overlapping sub-branches.  The first 
involves claims that neuroscientific findings per se entail normative 
consequences.  The Greene/Cohen claim is of this type.  The second involves 
whether neuroscientific findings raise new ethical or legal issues or should 
affect principles, doctrines and practices that are already familiar. 
Law and ethics, which include neurolaw and neuroethics, are two of the 
primary institutions humans have devised to guide our interpersonal lives.   
They share this primary function with many other institutions, including 
custom, etiquette, and social norms.  Each gives us reasons to behave one way 
or another as we pursue our lives together.  Although normative ethics and 
law share action-guiding and value-creating functions, law is also backed by 
the coercive power of the state, so it plays a central role in and applies to the 
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lives of all, including those who may disagree with particular laws.  It still 
gives them at least instrumental reasons to conform.  Although most theorists 
believe that morality and law are not co-extensive, the law often adopts rules 
that are primarily supported by moral considerations.  Think of the core 
prohibitions of criminal law, which criminalize force, fraud and theft.  
Consequently, the most powerful practical role that normative neuroethics 
may play is to influence law-makers. 
This entry begins by speculating about why, despite the limited 
achievements of behavioral (cognitive, social and affective) neuroscience to 
date, so many philosophers and lawyers are making what are apparently 
inflated claims about the implications of neuroscience for their fields (Morse, 
2006, 2013). It next offers a brief overview of the methodology of behavioral 
neuroscience and the limitations on what we know at present and are likely to 
know in the future.  In particular, it discusses whether neuroscience sheds new 
light on the relation between brain, mind and action.  The entry then discusses 
a neuroscientific challenge to both normative disciplines, which is the claim 
that we are not agents at all.  Both normative disciplines assume that ethics 
and law in large part are action-guiding.  If we are not agents who can be 
guided by reason, what is the status of ethics and law?  Perhaps the reasons 
ethics and law provide are epiphenomenal and thus they would have no 
genuinely causal action-guiding potential.  This is a foundationally radical 
challenge that needs to be addressed before turning to normative neuroethics 
and neurolaw. 
The entry then turns to normative neuroethics and neurolaw.  The 
central thesis is that although the new neuroscience, especially fueled by non-
invasive neuroimaging, is a new science using a new technology, at present 
and for the foreseeable future, unless if produces a radical shift  in our 
understanding of ourselves, it raises no new ethical or legal challenges or 
dilemmas.  That is, when the findings of the new science raise familiar ethical 
or legal problems, the resources to deal with them are already at hand.  
Moreover, nothing in the empirical literature yet per se compels changes in 
normative ethical or legal methods or conclusions.  There are well informed, 
well-meaning people who believe that the latter claim is false and that what 
we know already compels normative changes.  An implication of this entry, 
however, is that the burden of persuasion is on proponents of 
neuroscientifically-motivated changes to demonstrate that the findings that 
allegedly compel changes are sufficiently well-established and that the 
normative implications of such findings are sufficiently clear and 
uncontroversial to make such changes. 
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In neurolaw, the situation is especially complicated.  What legislators, 
administrative officers, judges, and juries decide is authoritatively backed by 
the coercive power of the state, so the issues are not just intellectual and 
theoretical.  They have more direct real world impact, even if the justification 
for this impact may be weak or even non-existent.  For example, advocates, 
especially for the defense in criminal cases, have continuously and 
increasingly sought to admit neuroimaging evidence to bolster various 
defensive claims.  Courts have sometimes been willing to admit such 
evidence, especially if the standard for admission is low, as it is in capital 
sentencing (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978).  Thus, in a sense, the age of practical 
neurolaw may have begun, albeit largely prematurely.  The findings of 
neuroscience must be translatable into the folk psychological categories of the 
law if they are to have relevance, but at present, neuroscience has little to offer 
to legal doctrine, policy and practice.  In the future, one can expect that as the 
science matures and accumulates, it will make modest contributions to law, 
but it is unlikely to revolutionize law or to per se entail any particular changes 
in law. 
II. The Sources of Inflated Claims for Neuroscience 
 Law and ethics have considered the findings from many sciences, 
including, sociology, different types of psychology, such as behaviorism and 
psychodynamic psychology, psychiatry, genetics, and now neuroscience.  
Although there are ethical and legal subdisciplines that have arisen as a result 
of the sciences, such as bioethics or psychiatric ethics, for the most part, none 
of these has been based on a revolutionary approach to law or ethics.  They 
primarily use familiar legal and ethical concepts to address traditional issues 
the new sciences might produce.  For example, genomic information about 
individuals might raise acute privacy or human enhancement issues, but these 
are traditional questions.  The most revolutionary claim arising from these 
sciences is typically the hoary claim that determinism is incompatible with 
free will and responsibility.  Each of the various sciences has presented itself 
as the newest proof of determinism that allegedly should upend doctrines and 
practices based on personal responsibility, typically in favor of one form or 
another of consequentially-based social control that is often mischaracterized 
as “medical” (Menninger, 1968).  Nonetheless, none of these has engendered 
the type of academic and public enthusiasm (and fear) that neuroscience has 
produced. The question is why. 
 The relation of the brain to the mind and action has been at the center 
philosophical and scientific attention for centuries.  We can roughly date the 
“neuroscientific” approach to understanding behavior to the case of Phineas 
Gage, a railroad construction foreman who suffered a severe injury to his 
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frontal cortex in 1848 as a result of an accident, but who miraculously lived.  
The traditional narrative, about which there is some doubt, is that prior to the 
accident Gage was a model of probity and rectitude, but after the injury he 
became disinhibited and his prior executive control skills deteriorated.  Today 
we have a better understanding of the relation of frontal cortical function to 
executive control, but even then, the case was a powerful demonstration of 
the relation of brain structure and function to behavior.   Not until the advent 
of non-invasive functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) imaging in the early 
1990s, however, and not really until the early aughts, when scanners (often 
colloquially referred to as “magnets”) became more widely available, was a 
technology available that could investigate large numbers of non-clinical 
subjects.  As a result of the increasing availability of fMRI, there is now an 
immense and increasing literature on the relation of brain to behavior that has 
fueled the scientific and popular imagination.  This work seems somehow 
more rigorously scientific than previous sciences of behavior and the images 
produced, which are not “pictures” of the brain, can be ravishingly arresting.  
In a metaphor that seems question-begging because it assumes a form of 
mind/brain reductionism that is philosophically controversial, many 
enthusiasts claim we can now “look under the hood” of the acting agent to 
discern what the driving mechanisms are.  Again, of course the brain is 
necessary for mind and action and we are discovering neural correlates and 
sometimes causes of mental states and actions, but acting human beings are 
usually not thought to be mere mechanisms like automobiles.  Although, as 
the next section of the entry suggests, such beliefs are at present unjustified, 
the possibility has created great expectations. 
 I speculate that there are three sources of what I have termed 
neuroexuberance among philosophers, lawyers and others. The history of 
normative ethics and law as action guiding is overwhelming one of conflict 
and irresolution with no method to establish an obviously right answer 
(although many of course do believe that their position is the right answer).  
There is no experiment, even in principle, to indicate that humans should 
behave one way or another.  It is all contestable. Nonetheless, many seem to 
believe that the findings of the “hard” science of neuroscience may hold a key.  
Even the Supreme Court of the United States fell prey to this belief when it 
distinguished neuroscience from social sciences (Miller v. Alabama, 2012, n. 
5). 
 Second, many philosophers and lawyers are profoundly skeptical of 
deontology and especially of retributive justifications for state blame and 
punishment.  Some incorrectly think that neuroscience proves that 
determinism is true, which, when coupled with hard determinist metaphysics 
7 
 
provides the desired conclusions that no one is really responsible for any 
behavior and that we should jettison outmoded and unjust retributively-based 
responsibility practices for consequentially-based social control.  As noted, 
this argument has been made previously based on other behavioral sciences, 
but again, neuroscience seems like a more “real” science that at last will 
provide a genuine scientific basis for the argument.  Last, behavioral 
neuroscience is inherently interesting and fun, albeit often hard, to perform.  
It provides a tangible result, not just an “argument” to which some other clever 
philosopher or lawyer will find a damaging and perhaps even decisive riposte.  
It thus offers an engaging and welcome respite from the common frustrations 
and annoyances of normative work. 
 Again, the above is speculation, but the amount of unjustified 
overclaiming and exuberance that contemporary neuroscience has produced 
is striking and cries out for an explanation.  I have no stake in mine and would 
invite readers to speculate for themselves.  I doubt that anyone will rigorously 
investigate the question.  
III. The Present Limits of Neuroscience 
Most generally, the relation of brain, mind, and action is one of the hardest 
problems in all science.  We have no idea how the brain enables the mind or 
how action is possible (McHugh and  Slavney, 1998, pp. 11–12; Adolphs, 2015, 
p. 175).  The brain-mind-action relation is a mystery not because it is inherently 
not subject to scientific explanation, but because the problem is so hard.  For 
example, we would like to know the difference between a neuromuscular spasm 
and intentionally moving one’s arm in exactly the same way.  The former is a 
purely mechanical motion, whereas the latter is an action, but we cannot explain 
the difference between the two.  Wittgenstein, famously asked: “Let us not 
forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up.  And the problem arises: 
what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I 
raise my arm? (Wittgenstein, 1953, ¶ 621.)”  We know that a functioning brain 
is a necessary condition for having mental states and for acting.  After all, if 
your brain is dead, you have no mental states and are not acting.  Still, we do 
not know how mental states and action are caused.  Wittgenstein’s question 
cannot be answered yet. 
Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other neuroscientific 
methods—especially in understanding sensory systems such a vision and 
memory, for examples-- we still do not have sophisticated causal knowledge of 
how the brain works generally, and we have little information that is directly or 
even indirectly morally or legally relevant.  The scientific problems are 
fearsomely difficult.  Only in the present century have researchers begun to 
accumulate much data from fMRI imaging.  New methodological problems are 
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constantly being discovered ( E.g.,Bennett, C.M., Wolford, G.L., and Miller, 
M.B. 2009; Vul, Winkiekman, and Pashler, 2009; Button et al, 2013; Eklund, 
Nichols and Knutsson 2016). This is not surprising given how new the science 
is.  Moreover, virtually no studies have been performed to address specifically 
normatively relevant questions.  Ethics and law should not expect too much of 
a young science that uses new technologies to investigate some of the most 
intrinsically difficult problems in science and that does not directly address 
questions of normative interest.  Caution is warranted, although many would 
think the argument of this entry is too cautious.   
Further, neuroscience is insufficiently developed to detect specific, legally 
relevant mental content or to provide a sufficiently accurate diagnostic marker 
for even a severe mental disorder (Frances, 2009; Morse and Newsome, 2013, 
pp. 150, 159-160, 167).  Many studies do find differences between patients 
with mental disorders and controls, but the differences are too small to be used 
diagnostically and publication bias may have inflated the number of such 
positive studies (Ioannidis, 2011). There are limited exceptions for some 
genetic disorders that are diagnosed using genomic information or some well-
characterized neurological disorders such as epilepsy that is definitively 
diagnosed using electroencephalography (EEG), but these are not the types of 
techniques that are central to the new neuroscience based primarily on imaging.  
Indeed, when the American Psychiatric Association published its most recent 
version of the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders—Fifth Edition (DSM-5) in 2013, it conceded that no validated 
neurological diagnostic markers for major mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia and major affective disorder had been identified.  Nothing has 
changed since then (Rego, 2016, but claiming that dementias may be an 
exception). 
 Nonetheless, certain aspects of neural structure and function that bear on 
legally relevant capacities, such as the capacity for rationality and control, may 
be temporally stable in general or in individual cases.  If they are, 
neuroevidence may permit a reasonably valid retrospective inference about the 
defendant’s rational and control capacities and their impact on criminal 
behavior.  Some legal questions, such as whether a defendant is competent and 
what the agent will do in the future, depend on current rather than retrospective 
evaluation of the agent.  Such evaluations will be easier than retrospective 
evaluation.  Nonetheless, both types of evaluation will depend on the existence 
of adequate neuroscience to aid such evaluations.  With the exception of a few 
well-characterized medical disorders, such as epilepsy, we currently lack such 
science (Morse and Newsome, 2013), but future research may provide the 
necessary data. 
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Let us consider the specific grounds for modesty about the current 
achievements of cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience, the sub-
disciplines most relevant to ethics and law.  fMRI is still a rather blunt 
instrument to measure brain functioning.  It measures the amount of oxygenated 
blood that is flowing to a specific region of the brain (the BOLD—blood 
oxygen dependent level—signal), which is a proxy for the amount of activation 
that is occurring in that region above or below base-line activation (the brain is 
always and everywhere physiologically active).  There is good reason to believe 
the BOLD signal is a good proxy, but it is only a proxy. The time lag between 
alleged activation and measurement and its spatial resolution are less than 
optimal (Roskies, 2013).  These difficulties will surely be ameliorated by 
technological advances, but studies to date, especially if they used lower power 
scanners, do suffer from these limitations. 
There are research design difficulties.  It is extraordinarily difficult to control 
for all conceivable artifacts, that is, other variables that may also produce a 
similar result.  Consequently, there are often problems of over-inference.  
At present, most neuroscience studies on human beings involve small 
numbers of subjects, which makes it difficult to achieve statistically significant 
results and which undermines the validity of significant findings (Button et al., 
2013; Szucs and Ioannidis, 2016).  This phenomenon will change as the cost of 
scanning decreases and future studies will have more statistical power, but this 
is still a major problem.  Most of the studies in cognitive, affective and social 
neuroscience have been done on college and university students, who are hardly 
a random sample of the population generally.   
Many of the studies use other animals, such a rats or primates, as subjects.  
Although the complexity and operation of the neural structure and function of 
other animals may be on a continuum with those of human beings and there 
may be complete similarity at some level, there is reason to question the 
applicability of the neuroscience of behavior of other animals to humans.  The 
human brain is capable of language and rationality that mark an immense 
difference between humans and other animals. To the best of our knowledge, 
other animals do not act for and are not responsive to reasons in the full-blown 
sense that intact human beings are.  Is so-called altruistic behavior in 
orangutans, for example, the same as altruistic behavior in humans?  Although 
the point should not be overstated, we should be cautious about extrapolating 
to human action from the neuroscience of the behavior of other animals. 
Most studies average the neurodata over the subjects, and the average 
finding may not accurately describe the brain structure or function of any actual 
subject in the study.  This leads to a more general problem about the 
applicability of scientific findings from group data to an individual subject, a 
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problem called G2i for “group to individual.” (Faigman, Monahan, and 
Slobogin, 2014) Scientists are interested in how the world works and produce 
general information.  Law is often concerned with individual cases, and it is 
difficult to know how properly to apply relevant group data.  For example, a 
neuroscience study that reports increased activation in some brain region of 
interest bases its conclusion on averaging the activation across all the subjects, 
but no subject’s brain may have activated precisely in the area identified.  If 
such group data are permitted, as they now are for functions such as 
predictions, the question is how to use probabilistic data to answer what is 
often a binary question, such as whether to release a prisoner to parole because 
he is deemed no longer a danger to society.  This is a topic under intensive 
investigation at present, and I assume progress will be made. 
A serious question is whether findings based on subjects’ behavior and brain 
activity in a scanner would apply to real-world situations.  This is known as the 
problem of “ecological validity.”  Does a subject’s performance in a laboratory 
while being scanned on an executive function task that inter alia allegedly 
measures the ability to control impulses really predict the person’s ability to 
resist criminal offending, for example?  
Replications are few, which is especially important for any discipline, such 
as law, that has public policy implications (Chin, 2014).  Policy and 
adjudication should not be influenced by findings that are insufficiently 
established, and replications of findings are crucial to our confidence in a result, 
especially given the problem of publication bias (Ioannidis, 2011) and 
reproducibility skepticism (Chin, 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015).  
Indeed, replications are so few in this young science and the power is so low 
that one should be wary of the ultimate validity of many results.  Indeed, a 
recent analysis by Szucs and Ioannidis (2016) suggests that more than 50 
percent of cognitive neuroscience studies may be invalid and not reproducible.  
Drawing extended inferences from findings is especially unwarranted at 
present.  If there are numerous studies of various types that seem valid, all 
converge on a similar finding, and there is theoretical reason to believe they 
should be consistent, then lack of replication of any one of them may not 
present such a large problem.  The adolescent behavior example given in this 
entry’s introduction is a good example.  But such examples are at present few, 
especially in legally and morally relevant neuroscience. 
The neuroscience of cognition and interpersonal behavior is largely in its 
infancy and what is known is quite coarse-grained and correlational, rather than 
fine-grained and causal (Miller, 2010).  What is being investigated is an 
association between a condition or a task in the scanner and brain activity.  
These studies do not demonstrate that the brain activity is a sensitive diagnostic 
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marker for the condition or either a necessary, sufficient, or predisposing causal 
condition for the behavioral task that is being done in the scanner.  Any 
language that suggests otherwise—such as claiming that some brain region is 
the neural substrate for the behavior—is simply not justifiable based on the 
methodology of most studies.  Such inferences are only justified if everything 
else in the brain remained constant, which is seldom the case (Adolphs, 2015).  
Moreover, activity in the same region may be associated with diametrically 
opposite behavioral phenomena—for example, love and hate. 
Ethics and law are concerned with human mental states and actions.  What 
is the relevance of neuroscientific evidence to decision making concerning 
human behavior?  If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential 
contribution of neuroscience is large.  Unfortunately, it is in just such cases that 
neuroscience at present is not likely to be of much help.  I term the reason for 
this the “clear cut” problem (Morse, 2011).  Virtually all neuroscience studies 
of potential interest to the law involve some behavior that has already been 
identified as of interest, and the point of the study is to identify that behavior’s 
neural correlates.  Neuroscientists do not go on general “fishing” expeditions 
(But see Bennett et al., 2009, for an amusing exception).  There is usually some 
bit of behavior—such as addiction, schizophrenia or impulsivity—that 
investigators would like to understand better by investigating its neural 
correlates.  To do this properly presupposes that the researchers have already 
well-characterized and validated the behavior under neuroscientific 
investigation.  This is why, as the introduction claimed, cognitive, social and 
affective neuroscience is inevitably embedded in a matrix involving allied 
sciences such as cognitive science and psychology.  Thus, neurodata can be no 
more valid than the behavior with which it is correlated.  In such cases, the 
neural markers might be quite sensitive to the already clearly identified 
behaviors precisely because the behavior is so clear.  Less clear behavior is 
simply not studied, or the overlap in data about less clear behavior is greater 
between experimental and comparison subjects.  Thus, the neural markers of 
clear cases will provide little guidance to resolve behaviorally ambiguous cases 
of relevant behavior, and they are unnecessary if the behavior is sufficiently 
clear. 
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the behavior is not well-
characterized or is neurally indistinguishable from other, seemingly different 
behavior.  In general, however, the existence of relevant behavior will already 
be apparent before the neuroscientific investigation is begun.  For example, 
some people are grossly out of touch with reality.  If, as a result, they do not 
understand right from wrong, we excuse them because they lack such 
knowledge.  We might learn a great deal about the neural correlates of such 
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psychological abnormalities.  But we already knew without neuroscientic data 
that these abnormalities existed, and we had a firm view of their normative 
significance.  In the future, however, we may learn more about the causal link 
between the brain and behavior, and studies may be devised that are more 
directly legally relevant.  Indeed, my best hope is that neuroscience and the 
behavioral science will each richly inform the other and perhaps help reach 
what I term a conceptual-empirical equilibrium in some areas.  I suspect that 
we are unlikely to make substantial progress with neural assessment of mental 
content, but we are likely to learn more about capacities that will bear on excuse 
or mitigation. 
Here is an example of the current limitations of neuroscience for normative 
conclusions.  A neuroscientist and I reviewed all the behavioral neuroscience 
that might possibly be relevant to criminal law adjudication and policy.  With 
the exception of a few already well-characterized medical conditions, such as 
epilepsy, our review found virtually no solid neuroscience findings that were 
yet relevant (Morse and Newsome, 2013).  Similar conclusions were reached 
after reviews of “brain reading” studies (e.g., “neural lie detection) (Greely, 
2013) and the addictions (Husak and Murphy, 2013).  These conclusions are 
unsurprising.  Behavioral neuroscience is a new discipline that is working on 
problems of immense conceptual and scientific complexity.  Future conceptual 
and technological advances will certainly improve our knowledge base, but for 
now modesty is in order about what neuroscience can teach us about normative 
ethics or law. 
Let us conclude this section with an observation that will always be germane 
even if neuroscience makes huge leaps forward.  Neuroscience is a purely 
mechanistic science.  Neurons, neural networks and the connectome do not 
have reasons.  They have no aspirations, no sense of past, present and future.  
These are properties of agents.  Ethics and law are addressed to agents.  Thus, 
there will always be a problem of translation between the pure mechanism of 
neuroscience and the folk psychology of ethics and law.  This is a greater 
problem for neuroscience than, say, for psychiatry and psychology.  The latter 
sometimes treat people as mechanisms but also treat them as agents.  Thus, they 
are in part folk psychological and the translation will be easier than for 
neuroscience.  It is the task of those doing normative neuroethics and neurolaw 
always to explain precisely how neuroscientific findings, assuming that they 
are valid, are relevant to an ethical or legal issue.  No hand waving is allowed. 
IV. The Radical Challenge to Agency 
This section addresses the claim and hope raised earlier that neuroscience 
will cause a paradigm shift in criminal responsibility and related doctrines and 
practices by demonstrating that we are “merely victims of neuronal 
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circumstances” or simply “packs of neurons” (or some similar claim that denies 
human agency).  Fueled also by work in psychology (e.g., Wegner, 2002), this 
claim holds that we are not the kinds of intentional creatures we think we are.  
If our mental state, such as conscious decisions and intentions, play no role in 
our behavior and some or all are simply epiphenomenal, then traditional notions 
of responsibility, competence and the like that are based on mental states and 
on actions guided by mental states would be imperiled.  But is the rich 
explanatory apparatus of intentionality simply a post hoc rationalization that 
the brains of hapless homo sapiens construct to explain what their brains have 
already done?  Will our lives together be profoundly altered?  Will ethical 
notions and the criminal justice system as we know it wither away as outmoded 
relics of a prescientific and cruel age?  If we are just victims of neuronal 
circumstances, how should we live together? 
Before continuing, we must understand that this is not the familiar challenge 
from determinism that can be answered by compatibilist metaphysics, which in 
one form or another holds that sufficient freedom of will and responsibility are 
possible even if determinism or something quite like it is true (a position 
discussed in detail in section V.A. below).   Compatibilism does not save agency 
if the radical claim is true.  If determinism is true, two states of the world 
concerning agency are possible: agency exists or it does not.  Compatibilism 
assumes that agency is true because it holds that agents can be responsible in a 
determinist universe.  It thus essentially begs the question against the radical 
claim.  If the radical claim is true, then compatibilism is false because no 
responsibility is possible if we are not agents.  It is an incoherent notion to have 
genuine responsibility without agency.  The question is whether the radical 
claim is true. 
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-mind-action 
connections, to claim that we should radically change our conceptions of 
ourselves and our legal doctrines and practices based on neuroscience is a form 
of “neuroarrogance.”  Although we may continue to see inflated claims and 
more numerous attempts to introduce neuroevidence in legal cases, the current 
state of neuroscience does not remotely prove that we are not agents (Morse, 
2015; Moore, 2012; Mele, 2009, 2014). 
The primary support in neuroscience for the radical claim was the work of 
neuroscientist, Benjamin Libet, and others who pursued similar work with 
similar and sometimes more striking findings (Libet, 1999; Soon et al., 2008).  
Let us focus on Libet’s work because he was the pioneer and it received the 
most attention.  It is an excellent case study because no set of neuroscientific 
findings has generated as many claims about the normative implications of 
neuroscience. Indeed, it is perhaps the only body of research in neuroscience 
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that has received book-length treatment by philosophers and legal scholars 
concerned about its moral and legal implications (Mele, 2009; Sinnott-
Armstrong and Nadel, 2010).   
In Libet’s work, subjects attached to an electroencephalogram (EEG) that 
measures electrical activity in the brain, were instructed to move a finger 
whenever they felt like doing so and to note by looking at a very precise clock 
when they first were aware of the urge/desire/impulse (there is dispute about 
how to characterize the subjects’ mental state) to move their finger.  Libet found 
that there was electrical activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA) of the 
brain, a “readiness potential,” about 350-400 milliseconds prior to the subjects 
becoming aware of the urge to move and about 550 milliseconds before they 
actually moved.  Libet and many others drew the conclusion that the brain 
activity fully causally explained the subjects’ actions. Conscious decisions (i.e., 
the conscious intention to move) were apparently epiphenomenal.  (Libet later 
tried to find what was waggishly termed “free won’t” in the subjects’ ability to 
“veto” the intention to move during the last 150 milliseconds, but this was a 
conceptual error on Libet’s own account.) 
Conceptual and empirical work seems to have exploded these claims 
(Mele, 2009; Mele 2014; Moore 2012; Nachev and Hacker, 2015; Schurger 
and Uithol, 2015).  The function of the SMA is not well-understood, the 
existence of prior brain activity is unsurprising, and there is no reason to infer 
that mental states such as desires and intentions played no contributory causal 
role.  It is hard to think of more trivial behavior so divorced from the agent’s 
reasoning, whereas ethical and legal issues always involve reasons.  It is not 
clear that the finding would hold for more complex, reason-guided behavior.  
Further empirical work has cast scientific doubt on the validity of Libet’s 
explanation for the observed phenomena.  And there is good evidence from 
psychology that mental states play a causal role in behavior.  Perhaps most 
important, the radical claim violates ordinary experience and commonsense.  
Any proponent of such a case bears an enormous burden of persuasion that 
cannot possibly be satisfied at present. Nothing in neuroscience (or 
psychology) demonstrates empirically that we are not agents.  It is possible 
that we are not agents, but as Jerry Fodor has argued, if we are wrong about the 
causal role of desire/belief/intent psychology, that is the wrongest we will be 
about anything since the belief in the supernatural (Fodor 1987, p. xii).  
The radical view also entails no positive agenda.  If the truth of pure 
mechanism is a premise in deciding what to do, no particular moral, legal, or 
political conclusions follow from it (Berman, 2008, first suggested this line of 
thought).  The radical view provides no guide as to how one should live or how 
one should respond to the truth of reductive mechanism.  Normativity depends 
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on reason, and thus the radical view is normatively inert.  Reasons are mental 
states.  If reasons do not matter, then we have no reason to adopt any particular 
morals, politics, or legal rules or to do anything at all.  
Suppose we were convinced by the mechanistic view that we are not 
intentional, rational agents after all (and what would it mean for an agent to be 
“convinced” by data and argument if the radical claim is true?).  If it is really 
“true” that we do not have mental states or, slightly more plausibly, that our 
mental states are epiphenomenal and play no role in the causation of our 
actions, what should we do now?  If it is true, we know that it is an illusion to 
think that our deliberations and intentions have any causal efficacy in the world.  
We also know, however, that we experience sensations—such as pleasure and 
pain—and care about what happens to us and to the world.  We cannot just sit 
quietly and wait for our brains to activate, for determinism to happen.  We must, 
and will, deliberate and act.   
Even if we still thought that the radical view was correct and standard 
notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert were therefore impossible, 
we might still believe that the law would not necessarily have to give up the 
concept of incentives.  Indeed, Greene and Cohen concede that we would have 
to keep punishing people for practical purposes (although the term, 
“punishment,” which as moral valence, seems inappropriate in a world without 
responsibility).  Such an account would be consistent with “black box” 
accounts of economic incentives that simply depend on the relation between 
inputs and outputs without considering the mind as a mediator between the two.  
For those who believe that a thoroughly naturalized account of human behavior 
entails complete consequentialism, this conclusion might be welcomed. 
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same internal contradiction 
just explored.  What is the nature of the agent that is discovering the laws 
governing how incentives shape behavior?  Could understanding and providing 
incentives via social norms and legal rules simply be epiphenomenal 
interpretations of what the brain has already done?  How do we decide which 
behaviors to reinforce positively or negatively?  What role does reason—a 
property of thoughts and agents, not a property of brains—play in this decision? 
 The radical claim is almost certainly false and provides no guidance for 
how we should live together.  There is still a great deal of work to do for 
normative ethics and law. 
V. Normative Neuroethics/Neurolaw 
Neuroethics and neurolaw will be treated together because the same issues 
are important for both and ethics and law bleed into one another.  Normative 
neuroethics and neurolaw are the application of traditional thinking to mostly 
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familiar problems that are also raised or are raised acutely by neuroscience.  
This section will therefore address a series of issues that have been most 
widely discussed: the “problem” of responsibility, enhancement of normal 
functioning, threats to liberty, competence, informed consent, end of life 
issues, and the ethics of caution.   
A.The “Problem” of Responsibility 
 This section begins by addressing the most general alleged threat to 
responsibility: neurodeterminism.  Then it addresses the criteria for 
responsibility before turning to the relevance of neuroscientific data to those 
criteria. 
Does the new neuroscience in fact pose a threat to responsibility 
because it demonstrates that determinism is true and determinism is 
inconsistent with responsibility? This is entirely familiar ground for 
philosophers of responsibility.  For over 2000 years, western thought has 
debated whether free will and responsibility are possible if determinism, 
universal causation or the like is true.  The deterministic explanations have 
shifted with changes in theological and scientific understanding and fashion.  
God’s foreknowledge, social structure, unconscious psychodynamics, 
behavioral psychology, and genetics have all been seen as the basis for 
determinist understanding.   Neuroscience is simply the newest alleged source 
of determinism on the block.  Despite such changes, the alleged 
incompatibility between determinism and responsibility is an ancient issue.  
In this debate, free will is usually understood as the ability of people to act 
uncaused by anything other than themselves.  If people do not have this 
ability, it is claimed, responsibility and other worthy goods such as autonomy 
may be unjustified.  This thought is what disturbs people about scientific 
understanding of human behavior, which relentlessly exposes the numerous 
causal variables that seem to toss us about like light ships in a raging sea 
storm. Neuroscience, it seems, will finally support this challenge because it 
exposes that the brain, the final pathway to action, is nothing but a mechanism. 
Neuroscientific or other biological causes such as genetic causation 
pose no more challenge to responsibility than non-biological or social causes. 
As a conceptual matter, we have no more control over social causal variables 
than over biological causal variables. In a world of universal causation or 
determinism, causal mechanisms are indistinguishable in this respect and 
biological causation creates no greater threat to our life hopes than social 
causation. For purposes of the free will debate, a cause is just a cause, whether 
it is biological, psychological, sociological, or as is usually the case with 
human behavior, some combination of all three. 
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There is no uncontroversial definition of determinism and we will never 
be able to confirm that it is true or not. As a working definition, however, let 
us assume, roughly, that all events have causes that operate according to the 
physical laws of the universe and that were themselves caused by those same 
laws operating on prior states of the universe in a continuous thread of 
causation going back to the first state. Modern physics teaches, of course, that 
there are indeterministically caused events in the universe, especially at the 
subatomic level.  A few philosophers (e.g., Kane, 1998) utilize this as the basis 
for libertarian freedom of the will.  But if indeterministic processes in the brain 
are part of the causation of behavior, this hardly seems to secure the type of 
freedom that we care about.  After all, if the brain is in part a random-number 
generator, this does not seem to provide the agentic authorship of our actions 
that underpins our notions of responsibility.  Thus, even if the original 
working definition of determinism is too strong, the universe seems 
sufficiently regular and lawful that it appears that we must adopt the 
hypothesis that universal causation is approximately correct.  The 
philosopher, Galen Strawson, calls this the “realism constraint,” (Strawson, 
1989) and it is certainly a view accepted by most scientifically-informed 
people, even if they are also humanists.  If this is true, the people we are and 
the actions we perform have been caused by a chain of causation over which 
we had no control and for which we could not possibly be responsible. How 
would responsibility be possible for action or anything else in such a universe 
(see Cashmore, 2010, for a particularly strong argument)? 
This is an “all or none” debate.  If determinism or universal causation 
is true and incompatible with responsibility, then no one can be responsible 
for anything.  Thus, unless there is a plausible answer either to the truth of 
determinism or to the alleged incompatibility of determinism with 
responsibility, genuine responsibility is impossible.  At most we can have “as 
if,” simulacrum responsibility that is used to shape behavior but does not mean 
that people truly deserve praise and blame, reward and punishment, or 
autonomy or constraint.  If this is the best solution possible, then there is still 
a real question whether it would “work” if everyone knew that holding each 
other responsible, praising and blaming, and rewarding and punishing had no 
adequate justification other than as incentives to shape behavior. 
The notion that human beings have the god-like ability to act uncaused 
by anything other than themselves, is considered by most philosophers to be 
a “panicky” metaphysics (Strawson, 1982).  Does this mean, however, that we 
must accept that responsibility is impossible?  Within the philosophy of 
responsibility, there is a plausible, mainstream position termed 
“compatibilism” that holds that genuine responsibility is not inconsistent with 
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the truth of determinism and the absence of contra-causal freedom.  For those 
who adopt some variant of this position, agents may be responsible if, roughly, 
they act intentionally, with reasonably integrated consciousness, suffer from 
no major rationality defects, and act free of compulsion.  Compatibilists 
believe that this is sufficient “freedom of the will” to ground responsibility. 
There are no decisive, analytically incontrovertible arguments to 
resolve the metaphysical question of the relation between determinism, free 
will and responsibility. And the question is metaphysical, not scientific. 
Nevertheless, compatibilism is an entirely plausible stance—indeed, in one 
variant or another it is the predominant view among philosophers of 
responsibility—and it is entirely consistent with moral and legal responsibility 
practices that now exist.   After all, even if determinism is true, some people 
are rational and some people are not.  Some people act under compulsion, 
such as in response to the threat of death, and (thank goodness), most people 
do not.  Note again, however, if the radical claim that we are not agents is true, 
then compatibilism cannot save genuine responsibility because rationality and 
compulsion are normative notions that apply to agents. 
In short, determinism and causation, whether arising from neuroscience 
or other causal explanations of human behavior, have nothing to do with 
actual moral or legal responsibility practices.  Lack of causation or the falsity 
of determinism are neither criterial for nor foundational for responsibility 
(Morse, 2007).  Using such terms simply confuses responsibility.  Therefore, 
in principle, no amount of increased causal understanding of behavior, from 
neuroscience or any type of science, threatens the law’s notion of 
responsibility unless it shows definitively that we humans (or some subset of 
us) are not intentional, minimally rational creatures. And no information about 
biological or social causes shows this directly. It will have to be demonstrated 
behaviorally.  
It is of course true that many people continue mistakenly to believe that 
causation, especially abnormal causation, is per se an excusing condition 
within our actual responsibility practices, but this is quite simply an analytic 
error that I have called “the fundamental psycholegal error (Morse, 1994).”  It 
leads people to try to create a new excuse every time an allegedly valid new 
“syndrome” is discovered that is thought to play a role in behavior. Advocates 
cannot pick and choose their preferred causes without threatening all 
conceptions of responsibility.  Causes per se excuse everyone or no one. 
Now let us turn to the relevance of neuroscience to responsibility, 
beginning with a brief explanation of the meaning of this concept that is 
central to our morality and law. 
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Responsibility is a formal and informal ascription about agents that lead 
to specific types of judgments, such as whether the agent is blameworthy. The 
concept of responsibility in morality, law and ordinary interaction follows 
logically from the conception of the person and the nature of human 
interaction. Morality and law can only guide action if human beings are 
rational creatures who can understand the facts relevant to their situations and 
conform to rules and standards through intentional action.  Responsible agents 
are therefore people who have the general capacity to grasp and be guided by 
good reason in particular contexts (Wallace, 1994). People, acting human 
agents, not brains and nervous systems, are and are not responsible.  
Responsibility, properly understood, has nothing to do with what most people 
understand by “free will.” Rationality, a behavioral criterion, is the primary 
touchstone of responsibility.   Lack of compulsion is also a responsibility 
condition.  Like rationality, it is also a behavioral criterion—essentially, 
acting in the absence of a very hard choice produced by a threat or acting in 
response to seemingly overwhelming desire.  The latter is not well-
understood, but it is part of ordinary parlance when we say that an agent 
cannot control himself. 
Virtually all formal and informal responsibility criteria depend 
primarily on assessment of the agent’s rational capacities in the context in 
question. For example, a person is criminally responsible if the agent was 
capable of knowing the nature of his conduct or knowing that his conduct was 
wrong, a formulation first introduced in English law in M’Naghten’s Case 
(1843) and since adopted in one form or another in both common law and 
continental legal systems. Some people who commit crimes under the 
influence of mental disorder are excused from responsibility because their 
rationality was compromised, not because mental disorder played a causal role 
in explaining the conduct. The rationality criterion for responsibility is 
perfectly consistent with the facts–most adults are capable of minimal 
rationality virtually all the time–and with moral theories concerning fairness 
and justice that we have good reason to endorse. 
The rationality requirement for responsibility--a general capacity for 
rationality in the context in question—is not uncontroversial and self-
defining. It must be understood according to some normative notion of both 
what type and how much capacity is required. For example, legal 
responsibility might require the capability of understanding the reason for an 
applicable rule, as well as the rule's narrow behavior command. What 
rationality demands will of course differ across contexts.  These are matters 
of moral, political and, ultimately, legal judgment, about which reasonable 
people can and do differ. These are normative issues, and, whatever the 
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outcome might be, the debate is about human action--intentional behavior 
guided by reasons.    
Coercion or compulsion criteria for non-responsibility also exist, 
although they much less frequently provide an excusing condition. Properly 
understood, coercion obtains when the agent is placed through no fault of her 
own in a threatening “hard choice” situation from which she cannot readily 
escape and in which she yields to the threat. The classic example in criminal 
law is the excuse of duress, which requires that the agent must be threatened 
with death or serious bodily harm unless she commits the crime and that a 
person of “reasonable firmness” would have yielded to the threat. The agent 
has surely acted intentionally and rationally. The reason we excuse the 
coerced agent is not that determinism or causation is at work, for it always is. 
The genuine moral and legal justification is that requiring human beings not 
to yield to some threats is simply too much to ask of creatures like ourselves. 
Now, how hard the choice has to be is a moral, normative question that can 
vary across contexts. A compulsion excuse for crime might require a greater 
threat than a compulsion excuse for a contract. But in no case does compulsion 
have anything to do with the presence or absence of causation per se, contra-
causal freedom, or “free will.” 
A persistent, vexed question is how to assess the responsibility of 
people who seem to be acting in response to some inner compulsion, or, in 
more ordinary language, who seem to have trouble controlling themselves. 
Examples from psychopathology include impulse control disorders, 
addictions, and paraphilias (sexual disorders of desire).  If people really have 
immense difficulty refraining from acting in certain ways through no fault of 
their own, this surely provides an appealing justification for mitigation or 
excuse. But what does it mean to say that an agent who is acting cannot control 
himself? People who act in response to such inner states as craving are 
intentional agents. A drug addict who seeks and uses to satisfy his craving 
does so intentionally.  Simply because an abnormal biological variable played 
a causal role–and neuroscientific evidence frequently confirms this (e.g., 
Kalivas and Volkow, 2005)–does not per se mean the person could not control 
himself or had great difficulty doing so.  
I believe that cases in which we want to say that a person cannot control 
himself and should be excused for that reason can be better explained on the 
basis of a rationality defect. In short, at certain times or under certain 
circumstances, the state of intense desire or the like make it supremely 
difficult for the agent to access reason. As always, causation and free will are 
not the issue. The assessment of human action in terms of rationality or 
common sense criteria such as “self-control” is in issue. Lack of control can 
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only be finally demonstrated behaviorally, by evaluating action. Although 
neuroscientific evidence may surely provide assistance in performing this 
evaluation, neuroscience could never tell us how much control ability is 
required for responsibility. That question is normative, moral, and, ultimately, 
legal. 
Now let us turn to the relevance and implications of neuroscience for 
responsibility. The easiest case to address is when there is evidence of 
severely altered consciousness. Moral and legal responsibility require action 
(or intentional omission in cases in which the agent has a duty to act) and 
rationality, and in such instances either the person did not act because the 
definition of action requires reasonably intact consciousness or the action was 
not rational because rationality requires the potential for self-reflection that 
altered consciousness undermines. This does not mean of course that the 
responsible agent must be fully aware of all or even most of the causes of what 
he is doing.  No one is, as a wealth of psychological studies has demonstrated.  
But the agent who may have no idea why he is behaving as he is will still be 
responsible as long as he is capable of being aware of what he is doing and 
potentially guidable by moral and legal rules and standards. 
Neuroscience evidence might well be relevant to assessing the validity of 
the agent’s claim that she did not act or our understanding of her mental state. 
Of course, the issue of the relevance of consciousness to responsibility was 
developed and people were able to evaluate such claims before any of the 
modern neuroscientific investigative techniques was invented. Neuroscience 
thus teaches us nothing new morally or legally about these cases, but it may 
well help us evaluate them more accurately.  In most cases when neuroscience 
is relevant to the existence of action, there will typically be a well-
characterized neurological abnormality, such as epilepsy, which involve 
traditional medical evidence rather than the new neuroscience.  And, once 
again, neuroscience has not demonstrated that human beings generally are 
automatons rather than agents. 
The more problematic cases are those in which the agent’s 
consciousness was intact and he clearly acted, but there is nonetheless a 
question about the agent’s responsibility, especially if there is evidence of 
some abnormality.  For example, as sophisticated people understand, 
abnormalities do not cause violent conduct directly and they are not excusing 
conditions per se simply because they played a causal role. Instead, they 
produce behavioral states or traits, such as rage, impulsiveness or 
disinhibition, that predispose the agent to commit violent acts and that may be 
relevant to the agent’s responsibility. After all, such states and traits can 
compromise rationality, making it more difficult for the agent to play by the 
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rules. For example, younger children and people with intellectual disability 
(formerly termed retardation or developmental disability) are not held fully 
responsible because it is recognized that their capacity for rationality is not 
fully developed. In these cases, once again, it is a rationality consideration, 
and not lack of free will, that is doing the work. Note, too, that if the capacity 
for rationality is compromised by non-biological causes, such as child-rearing 
practices, the same analysis holds. There is nothing special about biological 
causation.   
Syndromes and other causes do not have excusing force unless they 
sufficiently diminish rationality in the context in question.  In that case, it is 
diminished rationality that is the excusing condition, not the presence of any 
particular type of cause. For example, as the Supreme Court recognized 
(Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)), adolescents who commit murder 
when they are 16 or 17 years old should not be subject to the death penalty 
because their capacity for rationality is not fully developed, and not because 
the process of myelination of cortical neurons is not complete.  Incomplete 
myelination is only a part of the causal explanatory account of why the 
genuine mitigating condition—diminished rationality—existed (Morse, 
2006).  
Morality and the law were cognizant of the relevance of diminished 
rationality to responsibility and developed theories and doctrines of mitigation 
and excuse long before modern neuroscience emerged.  But unless 
neuroscience demonstrates that no one is capable of minimal rationality–an 
implausible scenario–fundamental criteria for responsibility will be intact. On 
the other hand, neuroscience will surely discover much more about the types 
of conditions that can compromise rationality and thus may potentially lead 
to a broadening of current excusing and mitigating doctrines or to a widening 
of the class of people who can raise a colorable mitigating or excusing claim. 
Further, neuroscience may help adjudicate excusing and mitigating claims 
more accurately.  At present, however, the findings of neuroscience are 
virtually never validly relevant to the actual evaluation of moral and legal 
responsibility (Morse and Newsome, 2013).  The practical relevance will have 
to await future conceptual and scientific advances. 
Most generally, some people think that executive capacity—the congeries 
of cognitive and emotional capacities that help to plan and regulate human 
behavior—is going to be the Holy Grail to help the law determine culpability.  
After all, there is an attractive moral and legal case that people with a substantial 
lack of these capacities are less culpable or competent.  Perhaps neuroscience 
can provide specific data previously unavailable to identify executive capacity 
differences more precisely. There are two problems, however.  First, significant 
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problems with executive capacity are readily apparent without testing, and 
criminal law, for example, simply will not adopt fine-grained culpability 
criteria.  Second, the correlation between neuropsychological tests of executive 
capacity and actual real world behavior is not terribly strong (Barkley and 
Murphy, 2010).  Only a small fraction of the variance is accounted for, and the 
scanning studies will use the types of tasks the psychological tests use.  
Consequently, we are far from able to use neuroscience accurately to assess 
non-obvious executive-capacity differences that are valid in real world 
contexts. 
The last question concerning responsibility concerns possible disjuncts 
between behavioral and neuroscience evidence.  The criteria for responsibility 
and competence are entirely behavioral, broadly understood to mean actions 
and accompanying mental states.  But how should we respond if the agent is 
undoubtedly rational but the brain is abnormal, or there is clearly irrationality 
but the neurodiagnostic findings are unremarkable.  In such cases, it is clear 
that actions speak louder than images (Mandavilli, 2006).  Once again, it is 
people and not brains and nervous systems that are responsible or competent.  
At most, neurodiagnostic findings might be relevant to resolving unclear cases 
at the margin, but for various reasons at present, we lack the technology to 
accomplish this. 
 B. Enhancement of Normal Functions 
The desirability and permissibility of permitting or even compelling access 
to enhancements of normal functions raises immensely difficult conceptual, 
moral, legal, political, and economic questions (Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, 
and Wikler, 2000, pp. 61-164, 181-203; Presidential Commission for the 
Study of Bioethical Issues, 2015 (including recommendations). This section 
simply tries to touch on the major issues.  What is interesting once again, 
however, is that although new scientific discoveries may raise the stakes, the 
questions raised about justice, equality, liberty, and efficiency are thoroughly 
familiar and rich theoretical resources already exist with which to address 
them. 
Let us first make the controversial but plausible and necessarily 
simplifying assumption that we can identify a reasonable and workable 
conception of normality and abnormality that will apply relatively 
uncontroversially to a wide array of cases.   Unless such a conception is 
possible, it will be impossible to distinguish between treatment and 
enhancement because that distinction is dependent upon a prior, baseline 
conception of normality/abnormality.  The boundary between normality and 
abnormality can of course shift as conceptual understanding and empirical 
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data advance, but if the distinction is valid, then a treatment/enhancement 
distinction will also have force. 
There is a lively debate in the literature about whether enhancements are 
wrong per se.  Opponents such as Michael Sandel (2007) claim that 
enhancements threaten to undermine our essential humanity, whereas 
proponents such as Allen Buchanan (2011) believe that enhancements can 
contribute to human flourishing as long as they are properly regulated. 
Bioethicist Erik Parens (2005) believes the debate is somewhat overblown and 
formulates the debate in terms of authenticity, which both sides value but 
characterize differently.  He argues that proponents of enhancement value 
self-creation whereas skeptics value self-discovery.   Further, the proponents 
note that new technologies that can confer benefits can never be completely 
suppressed.  Even if they are made illegal or considered wrong by large 
numbers of people, either a black market will be created if the enhancement 
is illegal or, if not,  those who do not share the objection to enhancement will 
use them despite the disapproval of their neighbors. 
We already permits a wide array of enhancements for those who can afford 
them.  Some are quite expensive–such as purely cosmetic surgery in the 
absence of disfigurement, psychotropic drugs prescribed to make people 
without diagnosable disorder feel even better, and prep courses for 
standardized tests--and, consequently, their availability is limited to those 
with the resources to purchase them.  Others, such as the use of caffeine or 
nicotine to enhance mental acuity, are quite inexpensive and thus available 
essentially to everyone.  There is certainly no general presumption that 
enhancement is per se undesirable or immoral.  The law regulates the sale and 
use of such enhancements very little or indirectly by requiring warning labels, 
prescriptions and other various means that scarcely prevent access for those 
with the necessary resources.  Private preference, conscience and pocketbooks 
are thus the primary predictors of which people obtain which enhancements. 
Some potentially enhancing agents are largely or entirely prohibited either 
generally, because the government has decided they are too dangerous for 
almost anyone to use them, such as certain stimulants, or in particular 
contexts, such as sporting events, in which use would be considered unfair or 
otherwise undesirable.  Such limitations do not undermine the observation that 
enhancement by cognitive and biological techniques is already widely 
permissible and acceptable in our moral, political and legal culture.  This 
outcome is not surprising in a society that values personal liberty and uses 
primarily market mechanisms to develop and distribute most goods. 
The use of enhancements raises thorny questions of distributive justice 
when the enhancements substantially increase the possibility that the agent 
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will thereby obtain other, socially desirable goods, such as access to better 
schools, jobs or the like.  Is it really fair, for example, that a student from a 
wealthy home who already has enormous educational advantages by going to 
better schools should then have the additional advantage of taking a prep 
course for the SAT or of having access to a prescription for substances that 
may increase alertness, concentration and other qualities that promote 
excellent performance on cognitive tasks?  Many views of justice deny that 
this is fair because they hold that most inequality is not justified, but others 
endorse the inequalities that result as justified by liberty, efficiency and other 
values.  We cannot resolve these issues, but we should note that as 
enhancements become more effective, the potential for unjust distribution will 
increase, especially if the original distribution of endowments and access to 
the enhancement are unfairly unequal. 
The discoveries of neuroscience may well provide highly effective, precise 
enhancement possibilities that will affect physical and cognitive functions that 
strongly predispose to improved performance in important life tasks.  Let us 
also assume that such enhancements would not have undesirable side effects.  
If so, and they are not freely available because they are too expensive for many 
citizens, then potentially unfair increases in inequality will result.  This could 
be addressed by prohibition or by making the enhancement more freely 
available by subsidization or other mechanisms.  The latter would not have 
the desired effect, however, because people do not have equal endowments to 
be enhanced.  Unless, miraculously, an enhancement caused everyone to 
produce precisely the same performance, the whole performance distribution 
would simply shift upwards, but the original inequalities would remain 
although they might be reduced if, as seems to be the case, those with lesser 
endowments achieved greater gains than those with more.  We should also 
note that highly effective enhancements may be used in the service of vice 
and not just for virtuous pursuits. 
Enhancing everyone in certain ways may perhaps be socially desirable and 
should be implemented (by various inducement mechanisms) even if it does 
not reduce inequalities.  For example, if people with low normal intelligence 
could enhance their cognitive abilities, then they and all of society might be 
better off, but such people would not become the cognitive equals of those 
better endowed ex ante if the latter were also permitted to use the same 
enhancement.  It is also interesting to contemplate whether, to pursue greater 
equality, certain enhancements would be permissible only for those people 
whose normal abilities were below some threshold and prohibited for those 
above that threshold.  I assume that in the United States such a scheme would 
be held unconstitutional at present as a denial of both liberty and equal 
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protection, but if certain inequalities threatened the social fabric, one can 
imagine a court upholding such a law.  In more highly regulated legal orders, 
such laws may be less problematic. 
May the State make enhancements obligatory? Some enhancements 
already are imposed.  Public education or some equivalent is a requirement 
for all citizens because the state interest in promoting a citizenry capable of 
informed participation in the political process and economic productivity is 
extremely weighty.  No liberty is absolutely protected and any may be 
infringed if the government purpose for infringement is sufficiently strong. A 
balance must always be struck.  Suppose, for example, there was widespread 
agreement that general improvement in cognitive skills would be desirable for 
reasons similar to those justifying compulsory education.  Why shouldn’t 
everyone be compelled to accept a new, neuroscientifically-discovered, non-
harmful enhancement for the good of the whole society?  The liberty of those 
who would not wish to be enhanced would be infringed, but perhaps the 
infringement would be justified. 
Consider the following analogy.  Forced inoculation–and note that 
preventive inoculations are another form of enhancement--might be imposed 
on all citizens to avoid a dreadful infectious disease epidemic, including on 
those people who objected strongly on religious, moral or other grounds.  The 
examples are distinguishable, of course.  One might say that failure of some 
people to enhance themselves cognitively does not threaten to make society 
worse off; it just fails to make some people better off.  In contrast, failure to 
inoculate threatens only to make society worse off.  The distinction is genuine, 
but the baselines against which welfare are assessed are normative and shift 
easily.  It would not be difficult to re-conceptualize refusal in the cognitive 
case as threatening harm.  For example, a more communitarian society that 
expected citizens to exert their best efforts and to accept enhancements in 
order to increase the welfare of all would treat a person who refused to accept 
enhancement as a threat to the society.  In sum, as the social benefits of an 
enhancement increase, the State interest in imposing it will also increase, but 
traditional concerns for liberty and freedom of thought and expression should 
politically and legally constrain compelled enhancement. 
The widespread availability of effective enhancements could profoundly 
affect our conception of normality, raising the threshold of normality 
considerably.  If this occurred, then certain abilities that were previously 
considered normal would now be considered abnormal and thus would qualify 
for treatment, not enhancement.  If this occurs and the disadvantage of those 
below the normality threshold is substantial, then such people would have a 
strong justice claim for the State to provide such treatment if they cannot 
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afford it.  According to virtually all current moral and political theory, the 
duty to provide treatment to the least well off is far greater than the duty, if 
any there be, to provide enhancement.  And all these considerations are not 
just ethical musings.  The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethics 
(2015) has already considered this issues and has made recommendations, 
including that enhancers not contribute to existing inequalities. 
What is the potential threat of enhancement to our identity and 
humanity, to our very nature (e.g., Harris, 2007; Garreau, 2005; Sandel, 2007).  
When we use agents that affect energy, cognition and mood, we are different 
from our “base-rate,” but we usually remain our recognizable selves and none 
of us remotely approaches “perfection,” whatever that might mean.  This is 
generally unproblematic for the reasons already discussed.  But massive 
changes produced by hitherto unimaginable discoveries in neuroscience could 
écreate such discontinuities between our usual and enhanced selves that our 
identities and sense of what it means to be human might be compromised.  
The fear is that we would become mechanistic robots rather than real people, 
beings that are engineered rather than largely self-created.  Many philosophers 
and others believe that solving the problem of consciousness is beyond the 
cognitive capacities of human beings.  Suppose, however, that immense 
cognitive enhancements permitted us to solve the problem.  Such a discovery 
would revolutionize our understanding of biology, would permit the invention 
of enormously powerful behavior control techniques, and would almost 
certainly profoundly alter our sense of ourselves and our moral and political 
beliefs and arrangements.  The prospect of this brave new world terrifies many 
people who would like to put substantial limits on enhancements of this 
magnitude.  The history of technology indicates, however, that technological 
advances that have clear moral implications—consider controversies 
concerning stem cell research, the use of steroids among professional athletes, 
or the use of massively destructive weapons—will be used if doing so seems 
morally justified or seems to confer a significant advantage.  One can only 
imagine what the ethical debates of the future will be, but one can safely 
predict that powerful and safe behavior control techniques will not be 
successfully suppressed for long. 
Finally, let us briefly consider two technologies that are currently used 
for therapy, but that might in the future provide knowledge that would lead 
to enhancements or to enhancements themselves: brain-computer interfaces 
(BCI) and deep-brain stimulation (DBS). BCI is a collaboration between a 
brain and a device that enables signals from the brain to direct some external 
activity, such as control of a cursor or a prosthetic limb. The interface 
enables a direct communications pathway between the brain and the object 
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to be controlled.  This relatively recent and still experimental treatment has 
shown promise for helping patients such as those with neuromuscular 
disorders or stroke victims to communicate or to manipulate their 
environment (He et al, 2013), or for other purposes, such as determining 
whether a patient with a disorder of consciousness is conscious (Lulé et al, 
2012).  This technique is non-invasive and has no side-effects.  DBS is a 
treatment method is which a small electrode is inserted in the brain that is 
attached to an externally-worn device that controls the dosage of the pulses 
of electricity to the targeted area.  It is now an accepted treatment for 
Parkinson’s Disease and it is entirely experimental for use with mental 
disorders such as refractory major affective disorder and obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Holtzheimer and Mayberg, 2011).  DBS is of course 
invasive and does have potentially serious side effects.  The number of 
mental patients treated with DBS is very small and it is impossible to draw 
conclusions yet about its comparative efficacy and probability of risk of 
serious side effects. 
The bioethical literature addressing such techniques is relatively 
sparse (see Schneider, Fins and Wolpaw, 2012 and Morse, 2012 for 
discussion and sources), but the primary concerns are informed consent 
(discussed generally in part V.E. below) and efficacy.  I raise them here, 
however, because both hold the promise of enhanced understanding of the 
brain-behavior relation that might someday lead to enhancements.  
In conclusion, it is worth noting yet again that neuroscience raises few 
new issues.  Enhancement based on behavioral psychology and genetic 
manipulation are familiar and much discussed topics.  Neuroscience simply 
raises the stakes by potentially providing more effective, targeted techniques 
for enhancement. 
C. Potential Threats to Civil Liberties: Privacy, Prediction and 
Treatment 
Neuroscientific discoveries may raise the specter of profound 
challenges to civil liberties that I will discuss under the rubrics of privacy, 
prediction and treatment.   Other sciences, too, might make discoveries that 
would raise similar challenges so the following discussion surely generalizes. 
The potential of neuroscience to invade our privacy by revealing various 
aspects of our private, subjective experience and to undermine our autonomy 
by predicting and controlling our behavior without our consent may produce 
the strongest reaction against its use and substantial regulation. On the other 
hand, the use of techniques that permit genuinely accurate lie detection, 
control of dangerous conduct and other valuable ends may be so alluring that 
the temptation to use it will be great. One need only think about legal 
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responses to the “war on terror” to recognize that justifying the use of privacy-
invasive techniques may not be so difficult after all.  
What constitutional or legislative limits may be placed on such 
techniques? This will of course depend on the political and legal regime in 
which such techniques are considered for regulation.  In the United States, for 
example, in a case that provides a technological analogy, the US Supreme 
Court held that the 4th Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures barred police use of heat sensors from outside a private home to 
detect marijuana plants within (Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001)).   If and 
when we are able to use brain states to infer mental content, what will happen 
to the privilege against self-incrimination that is so important in Anglo-
American law?  In the United States, testimonial evidence is privileged but 
so-called physical evidence is not.  For example, the state may involuntarily 
use a breathalyzer to determine if a driver is drunk.  As legal scholar Nita 
Farahany has argued, this distinction is confused, and she offers a more 
nuanced set of criteria, but the traditional distinction  is still in use.  Will brain 
states used to infer content be testimonial or physical? The issue is completely 
open and very important. 
It appears that in most liberal societies (broadly conceived) the state 
will not be able to use neuroscientific investigative techniques to go on 
“mental fishing expeditions” generally, but various state interests may permit 
infringing hitherto protected interests. Neuroscience undoubtedly poses a 
threat to privacy because its techniques might be used to gather information 
about mental content.  Again, this is not a new issue, but neuroscience may 
create increased concern because its techniques may be more invasive than 
previous technologies used for similar purposes.   
Neuroscientific techniques might also increase the ability to make 
accurate predictions about various forms of future behavior (see, e.g., Aharoni 
et al., 2013; Pardini, Raine, Erickson, and Loeber, 2014). If some behaviors 
that are particularly socially problematic can be accurately predicted, 
especially in an era of “big data,” once again there will be a temptation to use 
such techniques for screening and intervention.  For example, criminal and 
antisocial conduct are an immense social problem in the US; over two million 
people are incarcerated in state and federal prisons. Given the association 
between neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric abnormalities and criminal 
conduct and the increasing ability to detect such abnormalities, it is plausible 
to assume that neuroscientific techniques may well enhance the ability to 
predict future antisocial conduct among both those who have not yet engaged 
in such conduct and those who have. The social and personal costs of criminal 
conduct are so great that if the predictive techniques were sufficiently 
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sensitive and remedial intervention of any sort were possible, there would be 
a strong temptation to screen and intervene.   
It would be far easier to justify screening and involuntary intervention 
among people otherwise justifiably under state control, such as involuntarily 
committed psychiatric patients and prisoners and others under criminal justice 
control. Although involuntary patients and prisoners have rights in all liberal 
societies, they may be curtailed and techniques that increased the accuracy of 
predictions of recidivism would probably be acceptable to promote public 
safety.   
Widespread screening of apparently at-risk children and adolescents, or 
the general population–even if the risk status was identified by objective, valid 
measures--would be legally and politically fraught, especially if the predictive 
techniques and the necessary interventions were particularly invasive of 
liberty. Labeling and stigma effects and the potential for racial and ethnic bias 
would be frightening. The widespread usage of psychotropic medications 
such as methylphenidate among public school children suggests, however, 
that a screening/intervention scenario would not be unthinkable if predictive 
accuracy and remedial intervention were sufficiently successful and the “side 
effects” of both could be strictly limited. At present, the science is not 
sufficiently advanced, political resistance would be intense in most western 
societies, and, at least in the United States, it is probable that such schemes, 
even if adopted, would not survive a constitutional challenge. But it is difficult 
to envision how liberal societies would respond to techniques that accurately 
identified risk-creating variables and effectively intervened to prevent  serious 
social and personal harms. Traditional notions of privacy and liberty might be 
changed considerably. 
The new neuroscience increasingly is producing direct, biological 
intervention in the working of the brain and nervous system using techniques  
such as deep brain stimulation, vagus nerve stimulation and transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (Marangell, Martinez, Jurdi, & Zboyan, 2007).  The 
potential for such methods not only to treat recognized disorders or to lead to 
enhancements, but also to change thoughts, feelings and actions, which is 
often polemically characterized as the potential for “mind control,” is 
particularly disquieting. Many consider this a greater threat to liberty than 
genetic intervention.  
The government already has the authority to compel the use of 
psychotropic medications under relatively limited circumstances, and the 
failure of a patient to take needed medication that leads to dangerous conduct 
may be a source of criminal or civil liability even if the patient is not 
responsible when unmedicated. Nonetheless, the potential for widespread 
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intervention to change behavior is apparent. As is well known, the biological 
and behavioral definitions of abnormality and disorder can be controversial. 
At the extremes, of course, there is little problem, but the criteria for abnormal 
brain structure or function are not obviously self-defining, the criteria for 
behavioral abnormality are even more fluid, and there is a tendency to 
pathologize problematic behaviors and the structures and functions that seem 
associated. Thus, there is no guarantee that a relatively reasonable and 
workable criterion of abnormality will impose strict limits on the ability of the 
state to compel behavior-altering interventions.  
For example, the US Supreme Court has decided that the State may 
involuntarily medicate a prisoner with psychotropic medication only if it is 
medically appropriate and necessary for the safety of the inmate or others in 
the prison. If these criteria are met, the prisoner’s liberty interest in avoiding 
unwanted psychotropic medication must yield (Washington v. Harper, 494 
U.S. 211 (1990)). Although the provision of safe conditions in prison is an 
important state interest, there is widespread agreement that medication cannot 
be used solely to control prisoners’ behavior. Consequently, the concept of 
“medical appropriateness” is doing the justificatory work. In the case of a 
manifestly psychotic and consequently dangerous inmate (but most people 
with psychotic mentation are not dangerous) who refuses to consent to 
treatment, there would be little disagreement about the appropriateness of 
involuntary medication. Now, however, mounting evidence suggests that a 
class of antidepressant drugs with a relatively benign side-effect profile, the 
selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors, may reduce the incidence of violence 
among prisoners who do not obviously meet the diagnostic criteria for a 
depressive disorder (Walsh and Dinan, 2001).  It is extremely tempting to 
assume that many potentially violent prisoners have “underlying” or hidden 
depressive disorders or that the risk of violence is a pathology that is medically 
appropriate to treat. There is no incontrovertible conceptual or empirical block 
to making such assumptions. Therefore, it is possible that courts might 
approve a program that compelled medication after appropriate screening in 
order to serve the goals of safety and “treatment (State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 
94, 106-110 (Wis. 1995)).”  
For another example, the US Supreme Court has held that under limited 
conditions the State had the right to medicate with psychotropic medication a 
psychotic criminal defendant solely for the purpose of restoring the 
defendant’s competence to stand trial (U.S. v. Sell, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)). The 
State’s interest in adjudicating guilt and innocence in cases of serious crimes 
of violence and property was deemed sufficient to warrant infringing the 
defendant’s admitted liberty interest in deciding whether to take such 
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medication.  The Court permitted such treatment only under limited 
conditions, but there will be inevitable pressure to use such medication or 
other techniques that may lead to a final determination of guilt or innocence 
in criminal cases. 
A highly contentious, related issue, is the ethics of coercively providing 
or offering interventions to prisoners that might lead to early release on 
consequential grounds.  Such cases could arise if a prisoner is not dangerous 
in prison, but suffers from some treatable condition that makes him a danger 
to the community.  Consider pedophilic offenders, for example.  There would 
be enormous civil liberties issues if the treatment were coercively imposed 
despite a competent prisoner’s objection, but suppose the state offered early 
release in exchange for accepting the treatment.  In the latter case, some 
theories of coercion suggest that this scenario is not coercive because the 
prisoner has no base-line normative right to be released early.  Thus, the 
treatment proposal is really an offer, not a threat, and offers are held to 
increase freedom.  Even if such offers are acceptable, early release might still 
offend retributive conceptions of justice that hold that responsible offenders 
should get their just deserts for past crimes. 
The examples just given can of course be generalized. Once again, the 
state will have more power involuntarily to intervene in the lives of those it 
already controls, such as prisoners and patients, than in the lives of other 
citizens, but wider programs may be envisioned. Public health officials 
already pathologize violence, especially involving the use of guns, as a public 
health problem, and it is easy to imagine compelled treatment of the risk of 
violence as a justified method of protecting public health. Present involuntary 
outpatient commitment is usually limited to people with serious mental 
disorders, but as the example above indicates, adroit redefinitions of 
pathology and medical appropriateness might widen the state’s net 
considerably. Again, the current science and political will to accomplish 
effective widespread behavior control are lacking. Nonetheless, as screening 
and intervention methods become more precise and effective, there will be 
pressure to use them and proponents will defend their legitimacy. 
If neuroscience or other sciences ever reach the levels of understanding 
and efficacy necessary to make the foregoing civil liberties concerns a realistic 
possibility, it is difficult to predict what legislatures and courts will do. If there 
are pressing social problems that seem soluble by a technological fix, political 
and legal constraints may weaken, even in those societies that emphasize 
liberty more strongly. 
D. Competence 
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Civil and criminal law have many doctrines concerning competence 
that may affect an agent’s liberty, autonomy and other important interests.  If 
a person is incompetent in a particular context, the usual rules governing that 
conduct are not applied.  For example, in some cases a contract may be 
avoided by a party who was incompetent to contract or a will might not be 
given effect because the testator (the person who executed the will) was not 
competent to make a will.  In criminal law, a defendant cannot be tried if he 
is incompetent or unfit to stand trial, cannot be sentenced if he is incompetent 
to be sentenced, and cannot be executed if he is incompetent at the time of 
execution.  Roughly speaking, all competence doctrines are functional and 
depend on the agent’s rational capacities in the context in question.  A testator 
will be deemed incompetent if at the time of making the will he did not 
understand the nature and extent of his property and who his heirs were.  A 
criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he does not understand the 
nature of the proceedings and is not able rationally to assist counsel.  How 
much rational capacity the agent must have to be deemed competent is a 
normative question that can vary across contexts.  Neuroscience cannot tell us 
what the standards should be, but it may help thinking about such standards if 
neuroscience were to make substantial inroads in understanding the limits of 
humans’ rational capacities. 
At present, competence must be assessed behaviorally, focusing on the 
agents mental states in the context in question.  These issues long antedated 
the advent of the neuroscience and the new neuroscience raises no new issues. 
The question neuroscience raises is whether it can help make these evaluations 
without infringing on other interests.  At present the answer is no because the 
neuroscience is insufficiently advanced.  Behaviorally clear cases will not 
require neuroscientific assistance and unclear cases will get little help as a 
result of the “clear cut” issue (discussed in section III. above).  In the future, 
neuroscience may be able to help more because there may be clearer neural 
markers to help resolve close cases, but for now the issues must be resolved 
behaviorally. 
E. Informed Consent 
It is a commonplace that the legal doctrine of informed consent protects 
a patient’s or research subject’s liberty and autonomy. Competent adults have 
a right in virtually all circumstances to control what is done to or with their 
bodies and minds. There are controversies about how much information 
should be disclosed and what level of understanding a patient or research 
subject must achieve in order to make consent valid (Berg, Appelbaum, Lidz, 
and Parker, 2001), but all informed consent standards are based on the 
assumptions that the potential patient or subject is rational and that the 
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information provided will aid the person’s ability to make a rational decision 
about her self-determination. Once again, morality and the law’s model of the 
person as an intentional, rational agent grounds this doctrine. Exceptions to 
the need to obtain informed consent involve situations in which the person’s 
autonomy interests are subjugated to other values, such as cases of 
compulsory treatment, or in which the person is not rational and cannot 
properly be restored to rationality, say, by medication or psychological 
treatement,, in which case a substitute decision maker will be required.  A 
further complication is what values a substitute decision maker will use.  
Should the decision maker try to ascertain what this subject would so when 
rational (if the person has ever been sufficiently rational) or should an 
objective standard—what would a reasonable person do under the 
circumstances—be applied?  There are arguments for both approaches. 
Contemporary neuroscience raises at least two potential issues for the 
theory and practice of informed consent. The first is whether neuroscience can 
teach us anything new about the ability of people to process and to use 
information under various conditions, such as stress. Once again, the ultimate 
issue is behavioral–it is about a person’s cognition rather than about the brain 
per se–but neuroscience will surely improve our understanding of information 
processing. Better understanding would be unlikely to alter the doctrine of 
informed consent profoundly unless it radically altered our model of the 
person. Indeed, most of the controversy about the requirements for informed 
consent and most legal developments have been produced by changing views 
about the moral issues, such as how much autonomy must be protected and 
balanced against other values, and not by scientific data about the brain or 
behavior. Nevertheless, better understanding of cognition might alter practice 
considerably.  
The second issue concerns consent to neuroscientific research. 
Doctrines of informed consent to research developed somewhat 
independently of and parallel with informed consent to treatment, but the 
justification is the same and is perhaps more important because being a 
research subject often brings no potential benefit to the subject other than 
altruistic satisfaction or some compensation and it may impose substantial 
costs. Once again, improved understanding of brain function will not alter the 
fundamental doctrine and practice unless the model of the person changes, but 
neuroscience research does raise a number of important, interesting traditional 
issues.  
Much research will be done on neurologically and psychiatrically 
impaired people, which raises difficult informed consent issues if the 
impairments affect the potential subject’s rationality. Neuroscience may help 
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to identify those incapable of giving adequate informed consent to 
neuroscientific and other forms of research. People with abnormalities are 
prone to the “therapeutic misconception,” the error of believing that the 
research will benefit them, even when they are explicitly told that it will not 
or that it cannot be predicted that participation will help. This is a general 
problem about obtaining informed consent in a wide array of biomedical 
contexts.  
Another traditional issue neuroscientific research raises is incidental 
findings, discoveries about the subject that were not being investigated 
(Wardlaw et al., 2015).  For example, a structural brain scan to measure the 
volume of a region of interest may disclose some unexpected brain 
abnormality.  There are estimates that as many as twenty percent of research 
scans reveal such abnormalities and about three percent warrant significant 
medical follow-up.  Should subjects be informed in advance that such findings 
may be discovered?  What should be the protocol for deciding which findings 
are significant?  Should subjects be informed about apparently insignificant 
findings?  If what the scan discovers implicates the interests of others because, 
for example, an abnormality might affect the subject’s job performance and 
risk harming others, should the experimenter have a duty not only to alert the 
subject but perhaps to alert the authorities in an appropriate case?  Again, these 
are familiar issues and in the current climate favoring fuller subject autonomy 
and disclosure, more information should be provided ex ante and more 
disclosed after the scans have been read and interpreted. 
The complexity of the brain and its relation to behavior and to one’s 
conception of the self raises somewhat speculative but profound issues. 
Biomedical research can potentially disclose threatening information, such as 
the presence of hitherto unrecognized disease or the potential for it. 
Neuroscience research in particular can arguably discover information about 
the brain that could alter one’s sense of self or that is especially invasive of 
the subject’s privacy. Further, if neuroscientific investigation becomes more 
invasive, the potential for unpredictable effects on behavior and personality  
would increase substantially.   Indeed, the brain is so complicated that often 
we may be unable accurately to identify for the research subject the potential 
risks of neuroscience research.  The ethical question then is familiar—how 
much uncertainty is tolerable—but the stakes may be much higher. 
The informed consent to research issues just raised are traditional.  I 
foresee no major changes in practice for neuroscientific research, but the 
application of existing rules and practices may be contextually altered.  For 
example, if some of the speculative problems arose, I assume that either 
especially rigorous informed consent would be required or perhaps there 
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would be state regulation.  At present, however, moral and political theory 
and the law have the resources to deal as well with neuroscience research as 
with any other type of human subjects research with similar benefit/cost 
profiles. 
F. End of Life Issues 
In the developed world, death is increasingly defined as brain death 
rather than the cessation of heart and lung function.  As the result of disease 
or injury, many people have massive disorders of consciousness that are 
irreversible but are not the equivalent of death.  People in what is terms the 
“persistent vegetative state” (PVS) are apparently unresponsive to stimuli and 
completely lack awareness, although they do have sleep/wake cycles.  They 
can also be kept alive for very long periods with artificial nutrition and 
hydration.   
A central question is bioethics is under what conditions it is justifiable 
to discontinue artificial life supports and simply to let the patient die.  Again, 
this is a thoroughly familiar issue.  The contribution of neuroscience may be 
to help decide if a patient is really in a PVS or is in what is called the 
minimally conscious state (MCS), in which there is awareness.  There are now 
a number of studies using neuroimaging that suggest that some people 
diagnosed as in a PVS may be misdiagnosed and may in fact have awareness 
(Fins et al., 2008).  If so, this complicates enormously the decision whether to 
discontinue life support.  The patient in the PVS has little existence other than 
purely physiological, whereas the patient in the MCS may have a modicum of 
a psychological life and has some chance for recovery.  PVS justifies 
discontinuing life supports far more readily than MCS (if anything does, 
which certain religious belief systems deny).  These are difficult issues.  
Although neuroscience cannot tell us when discontinuing life support is 
justified and it cannot yet make definitive diagnoses of whether a patient is in 
the PVS or the MCS, in the future better diagnoses, whether based on 
neuroimaging or other techniques, will help make these decisions more 
rational because the facts involved will be clearer. 
VI. Neuroevidence in the Criminal Law Courtroom 
Quite recently we finally have preliminary data about how 
neuroscientific information is being used in criminal cases. Four very 
interesting empirical studies from the United States (Farahany, 2015), 
England & Wales (Catley and Claydon, 2015), Canada (Chandler, 2015), and 
the Netherlands (de Kogel and Westgeest , 2015) have attempted to discover 
the extent to which and in what way neuroscientific evidence is used in 
criminal cases.  Recent excitement about the potential legal implications of 
non-invasive brain imaging by fMRI motivates this work.  These studies begin 
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to examine the reality of neuroscientific influence in criminal cases.  All focus 
on appellate cases reported in various data bases for somewhat different 
periods in the range of years from 2000-2012 and all are admirably cautious 
about the methodological limitations of the study sample.  None purports to 
be an accurate representation of the use of neuroscientific evidence 
throughout the criminal justice system and other methodological quibbles may 
be raised, such as the failure to use independent inter-rater reliability for 
characterizing the cases.   All use a very expansive definition of neuroscience 
that includes techniques and data that long antedate the new neuroscience.  At 
most, the data are suggestive.  Nonetheless, the studies are interesting and 
innovative. 
The late, great baseball scientist, Yogi Berra, was apocryphally quoted 
as saying, “It’s déjà vu all over again.”  The data indicate that the courts amake 
the classic mistakes about the relevance of neuroscience and behavioral 
genetics to criminal cases that have bedeviled the reception of behavioral 
science in general and of psychiatry and psychology in particular.  The 
overarching classic mistake is misunderstanding or uncritically accepting the 
validity of apparently relevant science and misunderstanding the relevance of 
the science to the specific criminal law criterion at issue, which are primarily 
acts and mental states.  There are no brain or nervous system criteria in 
criminal law for any doctrine.  In particular, courts too often do not understand 
the following.  Metaphysical free will is not a criterion for any criminal law 
doctrine and it is not even foundational for criminal responsibility in general.  
Causation in general and brain causation in particular, even causation by 
abnormal variables, are not per se a mitigating or excusing condition and 
causation per se is not the equivalent of compulsion, which is an excusing 
condition.  And, finally, people with the same diagnosis or condition are 
behaviorally heterogeneous and ultimately it is the behavior that is legally 
relevant, not the diagnosis.  In one form or another, most of these cases exhibit 
these mistakes and confusions.  It is no surprise that one of the authors, 
Professor Nita Farahany, characterizes the cases as follows: “That use [of 
neurobiological research in criminal law] continues to be haphazard, ad hoc, 
and often ill conceived” (Farahany, 2015, pp. 488-89).  
 Not surprisingly, sentencing decisions were the most common context 
for the introduction of neuroscience evidence, but it was also used to resolve 
questions about many criminal responsibility doctrines and, surprisingly, 
competence, which as we have seen, is a functional behavioral determination.  
Perhaps the most striking finding is how infrequently the new neuroscience 
of functional imaging and related techniques are used.  This varies across 
jurisdictions, but the large majority of cases involve the “old” neurology or 
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the old neuropsychology that uses classical structural imaging or behavioral 
methods to assess brain functioning associated with well-characterized 
neurological conditions, such as epilepsy and frontal lobe injuries or lesions. 
Such diagnostic methods are far more common than fMRI, and in the Dutch 
and Canadian samples, there is virtually no functional imaging evidence.   
In sum, these studies suggest that the influence of the new neuro-
investigative techniques applied to individual cases for forensic assessment is 
quite modest.  Even when inferences are drawn in individual cases using 
group data about the consequences of various neurological conditions, the 
studies used are often classic behavioral studies rather than neuroimaging 
investigations.  Indeed, careful examination of the expanded case studies the 
papers present indicate that in most instances the neuroscientific evidence was 
far less important than the behavioral evidence and the former was used 
largely to buttress the latter. The neuroevidence was rarely dispositive and in 
the other cases it is impossible to know from these papers’ summaries of the 
case reports how influential the additive neuroevidence was. 
 The first question when considering the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, as always, is the degree to which the basis of the testimony has been 
established.  We have already seen in Part III. of this entry that legally-
relevant neuroscience is hardly well-established at present.  As noted above, 
it is no critique of contemporary neuroscience to note that it is working on one 
of the hardest problems in science, the relation of the brain to mind and action.  
For a specific example, the apparently wide but not universal Dutch 
acceptance of a brain disease model of addiction that guides legal decision-
making fails to confront the hard questions about the status of the science.  
Judges are not yet in a good position to evaluate neuroscience and may be 
either too critical or too uncritical (see Rakoff, 2016, for an analysis by a 
neuroscientifically-informed federal judge).  In what follows, however, I shall 
assume that the science is reasonably valid and that images in individual cases 
were properly acquired and evaluated. 
 The ultimate guide to wisdom about the proper use of neuroscientific 
evidence is a keen understanding of legal relevance, which in turn requires an 
equally keen understanding of the legal question at issue.  The question in any 
case, then, is how, precisely, does neuroscience evidence help decide whether 
an act or mental state criterion was present at the relevant time. No hand-
waving about relevance is allowed.  For example, a broken brain or a gene-
environment interaction that raises the risk of antisocial behavior is not per se 
a mitigating or excusing condition.  Such evidence is relevant only of it 
supports the presence of a genuine excusing or mitigating condition.  
Whatever rhetorical use an advocate may be able to make of neuroevidence is 
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distinguishable from whether the evidence is really, as opposed to 
rhetorically, relevant. The chain of inference from the purely mechanical 
neurodata to the law’s act and mental state criteria must be clear.  Unless the 
neuroevidence can help answer the specific legal question in issue, it is not 
legally relevant, even if it is scientifically valid.  Thus, if there is a disjunct 
between the subject’s behavior and the neuroevidence, actions always speak 
louder than images, except perhaps in cases of malingering (although the 
science cannot at present reliably and validly identify malingerers) (this claim 
is discussed further in the next Part).  If the defendant’s brain appears broken, 
but he is a rational agent, he is rational for legal purposes.  If the brain appears 
normal, but the agent is clearly psychotic, the agent is not rational for legal 
purposes.  
For example, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome plays a large role in the 
Canadian cases (although not in the other samples), but the potentially legally 
relevant aspects of the disorder are the cognitive and rationality defects, which 
are behavioral signs, that sufferers demonstrate from an early age.  Are the 
brains of FAS sufferers different from the brains of those without the disorder?  
Of course.  This is just a necessary truth of biological materialism.  If the 
behavior is markedly different, so will be the brain.  Brain difference is not 
per se a mitigating or excusing condition, however.  If a particular FAS 
sufferer is somehow sufficiently able rationally to regulate his behavior, then 
FAS is irrelevant to mitigation or excuse.  Moreover, if a FAS sufferer 
exhibited lifelong cognitive defects, as many do, that sufferer is potentially 
excusable even if sophisticated neurotechniques cannot identify the brain 
pathology or brain difference.   
Many of the cases in these studies fail to understand the relevance of 
the neuroevidence.  Even if there is clear evidence of brain damage or a 
neurological disorder, it does not mean that the defendant did not act, lacked 
mens rea, was less culpable, is incompetent, or will be dangerous in the future.  
All the criteria depend on direct assessment of the offender’s behavior.  The 
alleged relevance of neuroevidence to competence determinations, which 
occurs in many of the samples, is instructive but bewildering.  Criminal 
competencies are behaviorally functional and again defined entirely in terms 
of mental states.  Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges, can 
he rationally assist counsel, does he understand the consequence of a guilty 
plea, does he understand the nature of the penalty about to be imposed on him 
and why it is being imposed?  These normative, mental criteria must all be 
evaluated behaviorally. Either the defendant can perform these tasks to the 
requisite degree or he cannot.   
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These are continuum capacities, however, and it may be asked whether 
neuroscience can help with the gray area, indeterminate cases.  The answer is, 
no, for various reasons.  Any brain condition will have heterogeneous 
consequences.  Some people with very broken brains have essentially normal 
mental functioning.  But, cannot group data about people with this condition 
help us draw inferences at the margin.  Once again, the answer is, no, in the 
present state of neuroscience as a result of the “clear cut” problem already 
discussed in Part III.  In behaviorally unclear cases in which the law needs 
help the most, neuroscience is least able to furnish it.  
A critical reader will be repeatedly struck by how many of the expanded 
cases either used irrelevant or weak (or non-existent) neuroscience--e.g., to 
assess competence or whether a defendant suffered from a mental illness--or 
could have been fully resolved with more careful behavioral evaluation.  Of 
course there can be conflict about the behavioral evidence, but because act 
and mental state questions must be resolved, it is the behavioral evidence that 
is doing the real work. And for the reasons given, neuroevidence will seldom 
be helpful in resolving the gray area cases in which most help is needed.  Much 
is at stake in criminal cases and of course judges would like scientific help to 
resolve the vexing normative issues they must resolve, but, at present, turning 
to the neuroscience will do nothing more in most cases than to provide a 
rationalization for a result the judge wishes to reach on other grounds or to 
avoid responsibility for having to make the hard decision directly by relying 
on the expert.  Convergent behavioral and neurodata might help solve some 
of these problems that cannot be resolved with either type of evidence alone, 
but such convergent line of legally-relevant evidence are very rare. 
If a proper framework for the relevance of neuroscience to law is 
established and if a cautious approach to the science is adopted, I think 
neuroscience can potentially help refine legal mental state categories, such as 
mens rea and mental disorder through a conceptual-empirical equilibrium in 
which legal categories guide neuroscientific investigation that in turn then 
help clarify the legal categories.  Neuroscience might also help the fairness 
and efficiency of criminal law decision making by increasing predictive 
accuracy.  The criminal law already uses predictions for purposes of diversion, 
sentencing, parole, and the quasi-criminal commitment of some sexual 
offenders.  We have already decided as a normative matter that predictions 
are acceptable.  If neural variables make this practice more accurate at 
reasonably acceptable cost, that is an advance.  Finally, in tandem with 
behavioral science, neuroscience might help us more accurately understand 
legally-relevant human capacities, such as the capacity for rationality and for 
self-control, which would again improve legal policy, doctrine and 
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adjudication.  But all such optimistic outcomes will depend on precise 
understanding of legal relevance and valid science. 
VII. The Ethics of Caution 
The new neuroscience is enormously exciting.   Investigators are 
making important discoveries and we appear to be on the threshold of 
understanding some of the basic mechanisms of the brain, the key to ourselves 
and our behavior.  Consequently, and understandably, many people make 
exaggerated claims about how much we know and about the relevance and 
implications for moral, political and legal analysis.  Moreover, advocates 
propose using neuroscientific techniques in situations in which there is 
substantial and even overwhelming reason to believe the use is not yet valid 
or otherwise warranted.  Many such people suffer from a “syndrome” 
identified as “brain overclaim syndrome (Morse, 2006).” Neuroscience seems 
like such powerful, rigorous science that it might wield more influence than it 
should.  Such excess should be avoided to prevent misunderstanding and 
misuse, which have dangers of their own.  I shall give a number of examples 
to present the problem. The solution to such problems is obvious: caution and 
modesty in making claims for the implications of the data and technology. 
An op-ed in the New York Times purported to demonstrate that brain 
imaging could teach us a great deal about the “real roots” of political judgment 
(Iacoboni, et al., 2007).   The research base had not yet been peer-reviewed, 
which raises ethical questions in itself, but the authors also claimed far more 
understanding of the relation between brain and political judgment and 
behavior than science possesses.  Moreover, it was implicitly suggested that 
political judgments are simply reducible to the brain and do not have 
independent validity that can supported by reason.  For another example, a  
psychiatrist speculated on the potential brain abnormalities of  public figures, 
such as President Clinton, and suggested that perhaps all presidential 
candidates should undergo brain scans (Amen, 2007).  Not only is it unlikely 
that the writer had personally evaluated the subjects of his speculation, but 
there is not a shred of evidence either that most of the subjects suffered from 
the alleged abnormalities or that the subjects’ undesirable behavior was the 
result of these abnormalities. 
The US Supreme Court  decided from 2005 to 2012 a trilogy of cases 
concerning the just punishment of adolescents that mandated differential 
treatment for many serious adolescent offenders (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 2010; Miller v. Alabama, 2012).  Prior to the 
decisions, numerous professional organizations, including the American 
Psychiatric Association (Roper v. Simmons, 2005), urged the Court to hold 
that adolescents were not fully responsible in part  because neuroimaging 
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studies demonstrate that adolescent cortical neurons are not fully myelinated.  
In the latter two cases, the Court cited the neuroscience rather vaguely and the 
science was not necessary to the Court’s rationale because the Court adopted 
the controlling rationale in the first case without citing neuroscience.  The 
science was valid, but, with respect, the claims for relevance were not.  As we 
have seen, the capacity for rationality is the essential, behavioral criterion for 
responsibility.  This must be assessed behaviorally and cannot be “read off” 
from any brain measurement unless the brain variable is precisely correlated 
with the behavioral criterion in question that has been normatively identified.  
But we know that there is vast variability in the brain/behavior link and such 
correlations are well beyond present knowledge and may never be possible as 
a result of such variation.  If agreement existed about the normative behavioral 
standard and precise correlates not subject to the clear cut problem were 
discovered, then neuroscience might help resolve close cases behaviorally, but 
once again, this is far beyond our present capabilities.  Moreover, based on 
common sense and on excellent behavioral science studies that the Supreme 
Court ultimately cited, we already knew without question that adolescents as 
a class are on average less rational than adults and that such lesser rational 
capacity could provide a moral and legal basis for holding them less 
responsible.  It would be best to individuate such decisions, and the Court did 
so in Miller, but not in the other two in which they treated adolescents as a 
class.  Perhaps in the future neuroscientific evidence might help individuate, 
but yet again, this is far beyond our present abilities.   At most, the myelination 
evidence offered nothing more than an additive, partial causal story about why 
later adolescents might be less rational on average than adults.   The biological 
difference was per se not relevant to the legal criteria.  
Whether adolescents are sufficiently less rational on average than adults, to 
exclude them categorically from the death penalty or from any other 
punishment is a normative legal question and not a scientific or psychological 
question.  The neuroscience evidence in no way independently confirms that 
adolescents are less responsible.  If the behavioral differences between 
adolescents and adults were slight, it would not matter if their brains were quite 
different.  Similarly, if the behavioral differences were sufficient for moral and 
constitutional differential treatment, then it would not matter if the brains were 
essentially indistinguishable.  If the brains were indistinguishable, the most 
sensible inference would be that neuroscience is not yet sensitive enough to 
track the behavioral differences, not that we are mistaken about whether 
behavioral differences exist.  If the system were individuating responsibility 
differences and neuroscience was sufficiently advanced, then the science might 
help resolve close cases.  But as suggested above and below, actions speak 
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louder than images.  If there is a disjunct, except in cases of malingering, we 
must believe the behavioral evidence and neuroscience cannot identify subjects 
who are not candid about their mental capacities. 
 A related, usually unjustified application of neuroscience is the use of 
imaging evidence to aid criminal justice decision making.  For example, 
simply finding a brain abnormality of any sort does not entail any legal 
conclusion about responsibility.  Partial brain causation is not the equivalent 
of compulsion.  And again, responsibility criteria are behavioral and must 
ultimately be assessed behaviorally.  If there is disjunction between the 
imaging evidence and the behavior, the behavioral evidence must almost 
always dominate.   At most, the imaging evidence may help us resolve cases 
in which the behavioral evidence is in dispute, but only if the imaging 
evidence is relevant to the behavioral criterion in question.  At present, that 
will seldom be true.  In the future, however, as suggested above, 
neuroscientific evidence might help resolve whether and to what degree a 
subject suffers from a psychotic disorder that bears on responsibility. 
The final example of potential misuse is the use of neural lie detection 
(Greely and Illes, 2007).  The use of this technology has enormous criminal 
justice and civil liberties implications.  Private companies have started 
marketing neural lie detection technology.  Limited studies under limited 
laboratory conditions have indicated some success in detecting intentional 
misstatements under conditions when nothing is really at stake, but is there 
sufficient scientific justification for bringing this technology into the public 
domain?  Most informed observers think that neural lie detection has not yet 
been sufficiently validated for these purposes, and its unregulated use thus has 
the potential for enormous mischief if people credulously believe that it is 
more accurate than it actually is.  Indeed, in one widely-noted case, a federal 
magistrate judge excluded neural lie detection evidence in a criminal case on 
the ground that this method did not meet the legal standard for the 
admissibility of scientific or technical evidence (U.S. v. Semrau, 2010). 
 How should the law respond when valid and relevant neuroevidence is 
inconsistent with the defendant’s behavior?  Recall that the criminal law’s 
criteria are all behavioral—actions and mental states.  Therefore, cases of 
malingering aside, actions speak louder than images.  This is a truism for all 
criminal responsibility.  If the finding of any test or measurement of behavior 
is contradicted by actual behavioral evidence, then we must believe the real 
world behavioral evidence because it is more direct and probative of the law’s 
behavioral criteria.  For example, if the person behaves rationally in a wide 
variety of circumstances, the agent is rational even if the brain appears 
structurally or functionally abnormal.  We confidently knew that some people 
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were behaviorally abnormal, such as being psychotic (grossly out of touch with 
reality), long before there were any psychological or neurological tests for such 
abnormalities.  
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive.  Suppose someone 
complains about back pain, a subjective symptom, and the question is whether 
the subject actually does have back pain.  We know that many people with 
abnormal spines do not experience back pain, and many people who complain 
of back pain have normal spines.  If the person is claiming a disability and the 
spine looks dreadful, evidence that the person regularly exercises on a 
trampoline without difficulty indicates that there is no disability caused by back 
pain.  If there is reason to suspect malingering, however, and there is not clear 
behavioral evidence of lack of pain, then a completely normal spine might be 
of use in deciding whether the claimant is malingering.  Unless the correlation 
between the image and the legally relevant behavior is very powerful, however, 
such evidence will be of limited help.  Further, although the neuroscience of 
pain is making advances (Pustilnik, 2015) neuroscience cannot be used at 
present to diagnose mental disorder because scanning is insufficiently sensitive 
for these purposes. 
If actions speak louder than images and the clear cut problem (see section 
III above) exists, however, what room is there for introducing neuroevidence in 
legal cases?  Let us begin with cases in which the behavioral evidence is clear 
and permits an equally clear inference about the defendant’s mental state.  For 
example, lay people may not know the technical term to apply to people who 
are manifestly out of touch with reality, but they will readily recognize this 
unfortunate condition.  No further tests of any sort will be necessary to prove 
that the subject suffers from seriously impaired rationality.  In such cases, 
neuroevidence will be at most convergent and increase our confidence in what 
we already had confidently concluded.  Determining if it is worth collecting the 
neuroevidence will depend on whether the cost-benefit analysis justifies 
obtaining convergent evidence. 
For another example, suppose that in an insanity defense case the question 
is whether the defendant suffers from a major mental disorder such as 
schizophrenia.  In extreme cases, the behavior will be clear, and no neurodata 
will be necessary.  Investigators have discovered various small, but statistically 
significant, differences in neural structure or function between people who are 
clearly suffering from schizophrenia and those who are not.  Let us assume the 
validity of these findings although there is reason to be very cautious (Button 
et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2011).  Nonetheless in a behaviorally unclear case, the 
overlap between data on the brains of people with schizophrenia and people 
without the disorder is so great that a scan is insufficiently sensitive to be used 
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for diagnostic purposes.  In short, at present in those cases in which the 
neuroscience would be most helpful, it has little to contribute.  Again, this 
situation may change if neural markers become more diagnostically sensitive 
for legally relevant criteria. 
VIII.Conclusion: The Need for New Ethical Resources 
 At present, we have no idea how the brain produces consciousness and 
enables the mind and action.  What if neuroscience (or any other) unlocks those 
mysteries.  This will cause a profound revolution in our understanding of 
ourselves and may make possible extraordinary interventions in the lives of 
people, ranging from genuinely reading minds to mind control.  Current ethical 
and legal theory consider people as we understand them today and there is no 
radical shift yet in our understanding of the person despite the astonishing 
advances in neuroscience and other sciences.  Thus, current theory seems 
adequate to consider the issues that new technologies produce.  If a profound 
revolution in our understanding of ourselves and biological processes occurs, 
however, there is no guarantee that current theories will be sufficient to help 
consider and resolve new quandaries.  Let us hope that if this scenario should 
ever arise, new ethical and legal theory will be adequate to the task. 
________________________ 
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